what qualifies as military assistance to other countries

U.S. Armed services Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution

U.Southward. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution

October 15, 2003 26 min read Download Report

The United States is facing increasing international pressure to play a more prominent role on the world's near troubled continent. The standing civil wars in Liberia and the Congo, the specter of tyranny and man-fabricated dearth in Zimbabwe, the global spread of infectious diseases, and the rise threat of international terrorism in East Africa are all issues of mounting business organisation.

Almost of Africa's own militaries are not upwards to the task of supporting their civilian leaders in tackling these problems. U.S. military help can play an important role in helping them, simply U.Southward. peacekeepers are non the answer.

Instead, the Bush-league Administration ought to give the continent a higher priority in the Pentagon's regional armed forces command structure. The Administration should seriously consider expanding its U.Southward. Central Command (CENTCOM) to include Africa. This organization could help facilitate the establishment of a more constructive African-led military intervention forcefulness, reducing the need for directly U.S. interest.

A dedicated control could also more efficiently oversee U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Eastward Africa and provide American political leaders with more thoughtful, informed military advice based on an in-depth noesis of the region and continuous planning and intelligence assessments. In turn, better situational sensation of armed services-political developments could forbid the need for intervention or limit the prospects for engaging in open-ended or unsound armed services operations.

Finally, a sub-regional command for Africa would ensure a greater degree of success if Washington does ultimately need to intervene militarily in the time to come.

A review of the U.S. national security strategy suggests that while the Administration's priorities are on target, the Pentagon lacks suitable supporting initiatives and forward-looking organizational solutions to address Africa'due south bug. If an African control could be fix up, advisable solutions could be built around this basic building block.

Africa's Problems and U.S. Security

With its vast natural and mineral resource, Africa remains strategically of import to the West, as it has been for hundreds of years, and its geostrategic significance is likely to rise in the 21st century. According to the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the United States is probable to describe 25 percent of its oil from Westward Africa past 2015, surpassing the book imported from the Persian Gulf.1 (Sub-Saharan Africa currently provides the U.Due south. with 16 percent of its oil needs.)

In addition, Africa has the globe'due south fastest rate of population growth. The continent'southward population has doubled since 1970 to almost 900 one thousand thousand and is expected to rise to i.2 billion past 2020.two This will exist greater than the populations of North America and Europe combined.

With responsible governments, prudent management of their vast natural resources, gratuitous-market economies, and open trade, the nations of Africa could become vibrant members of the global community. Regrettably, however, much of Africa continues to be blighted by poverty, disease, misrule, corruption, and inter-tribal rivalry fed by the wide availability of artillery ranging from land mines to shoulder-fired missiles.3

Africa's troubles are many, and they accept global implications. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the world'due south poorest region, with a Gdp per capita income of merely $575 in 2002.iv Average life expectancy is just 48 years. In addition, an estimated 30 million Africans are infected with HIV/AIDS.5 Among the illness's many victims are the continent's military machine forces, whose weakened ranks are rife non simply with those who have contracted HIV/AIDS, but also with those who spread it.6 The spread of global infectious disease will get a more than significant trouble in the 21st century if Africa becomes the source of deadly pathogens that could plague American shores.seven

Nor is affliction the merely African crisis that could draw in the Us. Of even more immediate concern are political, economic, and ecology stresses that could well atomic number 82 to internal violence and resulting demands for U.S. intervention. The civil war in Liberia prompted widespread international calls for Washington to put U.S. troops on the basis. Eventually, 200 U.Southward. soldiers were sent into the Liberian capital, Monrovia, in August 2003 to assist facilitate the inflow of a larger Due west African peacekeeping force.

The The states must also exist vigilant for its own security, remaining alert to the rise of African "enabler" or "slacker" states that might foster global terrorism. Enabler states are countries willing to facilitate transnational terrorism, share intelligence, or sell weapons or weapons technologies to those who in turn might threaten the United States. Libya, for example, has a long history of back up for terrorist groups in the Middle East and more than 30 terrorist groups worldwide.eight

Slacker states are nations with lax laws or poor law enforcement, which unintentionally permit transnational terrorist groups to operate within their borders or allow state or non-land groups to obtain weapons or back up illicitly from the private sector. Somalia offers a case in point. With a dysfunctional central government, chronic instability, and porous borders, it serves as a potential staging ground for international terrorists.9

While poverty and instability lonely do not breed terrorists or weapons proliferators,ten African nations with weak ceremonious societies and poor law enforcement and judicial systems are vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by transnational terrorist groups. Enabler and slacker states are potentially important components of the global terrorist threat because such countries can expand the resource base of operations of lesser states and terrorist groups, making it possible for them to field more than substantial threats than they might represent otherwise.

Transnational terrorism already has a prominent foothold in Africa. It is no coincidence that Osama bin Laden found safe oasis in Sudan in the 1990s.eleven The al-Qaeda threat continues to grow in countries such every bit Republic of kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaeda cells are also operating in neighbouring Somalia.

Advantages of a Regional Control for Africa

Despite the growing specter of security threats emanating from Africa, the The states does not have a carve up regional command for the continent. In fact, 37 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are managed by the U.Southward. European command (EUCOM).12 This organizational arrangement is a vestige of both the continent's colonial legacy and the Cold War, during which the concerns of Africa were subordinated to interests in Europe.

EUCOM has remained actively engaged in Africa, with mixed results.13 U.S. participation in recent peacekeeping operations in Republic of liberia has been effective and appropriately limited. The control is also looking at establishing basing arrangements in countries like Tunisia and Kingdom of morocco so that U.S. forces can deploy to the continent more finer if American troops are required.14

EUCOM has too been an active participant in the Section of Defence HIV/AIDS Prevention Plan to help accost the pandemic spread of the illness in African militaries.15 The Administration has consistently requested increased funding for international military machine teaching and training, albeit at much more than pocket-size levels than for other regional problem spots.xvi

On the other paw, engagement with Africa has taken a backseat to engagement with other regions in the command. For case, while EUCOM has all-encompassing and successful country-partnership programs that pair country National Guards with the militaries of developing countries for training and professional military exchanges, there are no partnership states in sub-Saharan Africa. The Administration has also proposed substantial reductions in its support for peacekeeping programs, in part because of poor direction and inadequate strategic planning.17

The real issue, however, is whether standing to manage U.S. war machine affairs in this manner volition exist sufficient to encounter futurity needs or whether the Pentagon would exist better off putting in place new programs and organizations that anticipate the challenges ahead.xviii Even Full general James L. Jones, EUCOM's commander, has admitted that "we don't pay enough attention to Africa, but I think we're going to have to in the 21st century."19

Improving both the region's capacity to reply to a crisis and the organization of U.Southward. military engagement in the region should therefore be high on the Administration's agenda for Africa.

Prospects for African-Led Military machine Intervention

Transnational terrorist threats and the likelihood that internal violence and humanitarian disasters will prompt more calls for U.S. intervention will probable exist enduring concerns for America in the futurity. The United States could exist more sanguine well-nigh its chapters to respond to such threats if African nations had adequate professional security forces that could address the continent's many security concerns. This, nevertheless, is non the case.

To solve their most immediate security problems, African states need to place more emphasis on constabulary, justice, and correctional services.20 Competent, professional, and well-run armed forces under democratic civilian leadership can also play an of import function in addressing the threats of ceremonious war and large-calibration humanitarian crises, also equally the needs of counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism campaigns. For the most part, however, states have hesitated to devote advisable military resources to regional concerns.

African nations have attempted war machine cooperation, primarily through existing sub-regional organizations such as the Economical Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Eastern Africa Cooperative (EAC), and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). These include some member countries with substantial capabilities such every bit Nigeria and S Africa, both with armed services of over lx,000. Cooperative initiatives accept resulted in some joint unit of measurement training and express military-to-military contacts, but Africa has no continuing joint forces or command structures similar to those available to NATO.21

Most joint African operations are ad hoc affairs that meet with failure more often than success. A 1990 intervention in Liberia by the ECOWAS nations was a case in betoken. The Nigerian-dominated performance was perceived as a partisan effort, marred by widespread corruption and sustained by criminal activities that became ends onto themselves. A subsequent intervention in Sierra Leone was equally disastrous.22

Recent African-led interventions in Burundi and Republic of liberia hope better results, but there is no question that sub-Saharan countries in general lack the capabilities to sustain successful peacekeeping ventures over the long term.

U.S. Military machine Strategy in Concept and Execution

The Bush Administration recognizes that the continent needs help but falls curt in providing details on how that aid is to be given. The Administration's 2002 national security strategy, for example, encourages collective security and the support of other countries in addressing Africa'due south regional issues and argues that "Africa'south capable and reforming states and sub-regional organizations must exist strengthened as the primary ways to accost transnational threats on a sustained basis."23 It does little, yet, to amplify how this goal is to be accomplished.

The Administration's strategy also adds an unambiguous statement that the United states will act preemptively with military forcefulness against terrorist groups or rogue states that acquire weapons of mass destruction. But, again, at that place is no suggestion of how this shift in strategic intent applies to Africa.

President George Westward. Bush-league has demonstrated a willingness to commit more than resources in back up of the Administration's overall Africa strategy. The United States has significantly increased assist for helping African nations deal with the scourge of AIDS.24 In addition, the President proposed the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an initiative designed to accost the failures of traditional aid programs.25 The recently unveiled $100 million U.S. counter-terrorism package for East Africa was too a welcome footstep in the right management.26

U.S. armed services strategy is supposed to amplify how the armed services will achieve the objectives outlined in the national security strategy. While the United States has not released a formal national military strategy, the Section of Defense's 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) marks out the Pentagon'south priorities. The QDR also places special emphasis on building the capacity of partner nations for performing collective security. The current leadership in the Defense Section, still, has provided little boosted insight into shaping the American approach to Africa.27

With the modicum of official guidance that is available, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are tasked with providing overall direction for U.South. war machine activities in Africa and, in plow, tasking the combatant commanders to develop theater engagement plans for the regions in their areas of responsibleness. EUCOM'southward plan for sub-Saharan Africa includes several objectives such equally promoting regional stability, democratization, and military professionalism. The program directs a litany of deportment concerned primarily with training in basic peacekeeping duties, humanitarian assistance, and the mechanisms of civilian control.28

While the activities in the theater engagement plan are consistent with the national strategy, the existent outcome is whether they are sufficient to accomplish the task at hand. According to ane recent written report, all of the Defence Department's theater engagement plans lack acceptable funds, systematic planning, sufficient interagency coordination, and effective measures to estimate their effectiveness.29 The program for Africa labors under the additional burden of existence the subject area of an surface area of secondary concern for the theater commander, challenge the last priority on the EUCOM'due south attention and resources.

Breaking away from the EUCOM model would become a long way toward dispelling the continuing trend to recollect about relations with Africa in terms of "former fashioned patron-client relationships."30 In addition, more focused leadership on Africa from the Pentagon would result in better back up, intelligence analysis, and operational planning.

Today's geostrategic realities suggest that Africa shares interests with the countries in the Heart and Near Eastward that are aligned with the U.Southward. Cardinal Control (CENTCOM). In matters of transnational threats and economic issues similar energy (specifically oil) and trade, not to mention the significant Islamic populations in Africa, in that location are adept reasons to view Africa and the Heart E as an advisable group for U.Southward. security interests.

In add-on, some foresee the emergence of an African "religious fault line" that could bring an Islamic North Africa and a Christian sub-Saharan Africa into increasing conflict.31 If such a confrontation does emerge, the U.s.a. would be wise to accept a single U.South. combat commander monitoring the situation.

Given the increased operational concerns in the Heart East, including the occupation of Iraq, this region is besides demanding more and more attention from the general in charge of CENTCOM. One effective solution might be to combine Africa and the Well-nigh East region into a single unified control, with ii subordinate sub-regional commands: one focused on the Centre East and the other on sub-Saharan Africa. The addition of a sub-unified command for the Middle East would allow CENTCOM to focus more resources on this critical area. At the same fourth dimension, having a sub-unified commander for Africa would allow CENTCOM to address the common security concerns among the two regions more effectively.

Most important, a sub-unified command for Africa would give the U.S. military an instrument with which to engage effectively in the continent and reduce the potential that America might accept to intervene directly. It would likewise increase the chances of success if intervention is required.

A U.S. Africa command would keep closer tabs on the region--analyzing intelligence, working closely with civil-military leaders, coordinating grooming, conducting exercises, and constantly planning for various contingencies. As a event, the control would be in a ameliorate position to inform the political leadership in Washington of the state of affairs on the ground and provide more denoting advice for policymakers. Better-informed political leaders are less likely to arbitrate directly in ill-advised or unsound military operations.

A strong sub-regional headquarters and staff focused on Africa would besides provide an important anchor for interagency efforts, ensuring that military activities support and reinforce economical, political, and security initiatives spearheaded by other federal agencies. Combatant commands are already establishing joint interagency coordination groups to facilitate information sharing and integrate theater-wide activities. An African command could include an interagency staff designed specifically to focus on the key political-military machine problems that plague the continent.

An African sub-unified command might be constructed forth the lines of U.South. Southern Control, which manages military engagement in Latin America. A U.S. Africa headquarters would likely accept few forces straight assigned and would probably exist based in the U.s.a., possibly in Tampa where information technology could be collocated with U.S. Special Operations Control and CENTCOM, two organizations with which it would most probable work closely. Savings accrued past reorganizing the European Command could be used to help establish an Africa Command.

What the Usa Should Do

Creating an Africa Command would go a long way toward turning the Bush Administration's well-aimed strategic priorities for Africa into reality. If the Administration could farther refine its regional objectives for Africa in a formal national armed services strategy, so much the better.

Specifically, the Administration should:

• Identify a priority on fighting global terrorism in Africa
  The Bush Administration should increase its efforts to coordinate security measures with African countries at risk from terrorism. The United States must also be prepared to take pre-emptive action if intelligence sources indicate that terrorists are preparing to utilize weapons of mass devastation. Where the terrorist threat is immediate and overwhelming, pre-emptive strikes are justified on grounds of self-defence force.32
• Be prepared to intervene straight in Africa when vital U.S. interests are at stake
  America must not be afraid to employ its forces decisively when vital national interests are threatened. On the other hand, where U.S. vital interests are not at stake, the Us should be circumspect, just not necessarily absent, in providing military aid to the region, particularly with respect to preventing genocide.

  In the 1990s, the U.s.a. was largely content to take a backseat office in Africa. The U.Southward. intervention in Somalia was America's but significant involvement in the continent in that decade. The ill-blighted U.S. armed forces operation in Mogadishu weakened the resolve of the Clinton Administration to accept a more pro-active office. Empty rhetoric about human rights replaced activity on the basis. In 1994, the Usa and other earth powers stood past while indigenous Hutus slaughtered a million Tutsi tribesmen in Rwanda.33 Strong U.S. leadership was not employed to foreclose genocide.

• Assist African states with the specific military support they demand
  The most appropriate role for U.S. forces in the case of an intervention in Africa should exist to provide support that other regional militaries lack, including air and naval ship; advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; communications; and perhaps some assets for force protection. For example, in 1999, the U.S. military machine provided staff and logistical back up for the multinational intervention in East Timor. The "East timor model" should serve as an exemplar for how American forces could be used advantageously to back up vital humanitarian operations.

  Large-scale use of U.S. combat forces in Africa is not desirable. The armed forces are already straining to meet the demands of the global war on terrorism. In that regard, the U.S. should carefully measure its part in peacemaking operations, equally they could well embroil the United States in conflicts that would require substantial war machine resource.

  The U.s. should reserve its forces for the dandy-ability missions that require the preponderance of armed services ability that only the United States can provide.34 Meanwhile, the U.South. should calibrate its military aid for Africa in a manner that best reflects Africa'due south needs and the gaps that are left unfilled by other countries.

• Provide more than military assistance to African democracies in peacetime
  The best way for the U.S. to forbid the deportation of millions of Africans and finish genocidal campaigns would exist to discourage serious threats before they become serious. That can be accomplished by helping African nations to go more productive members of the global community. Helping to foster the development of African militaries is essential, and it is of item importance that the U.Due south. aid them in enhancing their capacity to intervene to stop genocide, deal with humanitarian crises, and fight terrorism.
• Back up the institution of an African intervention force
  The Bush-league Assistants should work closely with the British regime, which has a history of involvement in such efforts, to help facilitate and railroad train a pan-African force that tin arbitrate in crunch situations on the African continent.

  Where possible, the U.S. should encourage leading African nations such as South Africa and Nigeria to have on the brunt of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In the past, many of their efforts have been a disappointment, hamstrung by poor equipment, inadequate resources, and faulty civilian control.

  Africa has more than than enough war machine manpower to see its security needs. The trouble is that existing forces are also often decadent, ill-trained, and tend to be used to set on neighboring countries rather than to assistance them. The United States tin best serve past helping African allies to get their military house in gild. That ways providing countries with advisory and technical assist, as well every bit more international military didactics and training in the Usa. This is a claiming that will have many years simply in the end will conduct more fruit than a series of direct interventions.

• Constitute an Africa Command subordinate to CENTCOM
  The United States' military policy on Africa suffers from inattention under the Pentagon's electric current organizational construction. A sub-unified control for Africa would give the U.S. military an musical instrument with which to appoint effectively in the continent and reduce the potential that America might have to arbitrate straight.

Conclusion

In an increasingly globalized world, the United states of america and other leading nations cannot afford to ignore Africa's problems. Simply while the U.South. should intervene militarily in Africa where U.Due south. vital interests are threatened, it cannot constabulary the continent by sending in ground forces to all its numerous trouble spots.

Instead, the U.Due south. ought to establish a command that can focus more closely on Africa'south issues, lend assistance to favorable African militaries so that they can tackle their own problems better, and build upwardly the ability of regional superpowers South Africa and Nigeria to resolve regional problems. Ultimately, the establishment of such a U.South. Africa control volition reduce the need for Washington to intervene in the continent.

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., is Jay Kingham Beau in International Regulatory Diplomacy in the Center for International Trade and Economics, at the Heritage Foundation.35

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Authors

Nile Gardiner

Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Liberty and Bernard and Barbara Lomas Beau

James Carafano

Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute

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Source: https://www.heritage.org/africa/report/us-military-assistance-africa-better-solution

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